Hashrate Boost

1. Overview

BTB Hashrate boost is a mechanism that allows users to increase mining output by staking the platform token BTB for a fixed lock period. The Boost design is USD-anchored, meaning staking requirements scale with the USD tier value of a miner, rather than a fixed BTB amount. This makes the system more stable under token price volatility and easier to operate across multiple miner tiers.

Boost is designed to be:

  • Simple for users: choose a miner (or all miners), select a lock duration (up to 1 year), stake BTB, and receive an estimated acceleration multiplier.

  • Predictable for the protocol: staking value is converted to USD using a locked reference price at order time.

  • Configurable for operators: key parameters can be adjusted to tune incentives, user participation, and tier demand.


2. Key Concepts

2.1 Miners and Tier Value

Each miner is assigned a notional tier value in USD:

  • V_usd: the miner’s tier value (USD).

    • Single-miner boost: V_usd is that miner’s value.

    • Portfolio boost (“all miners”): V_usd is the sum of values across eligible miners.

This USD anchor is the basis for consistent incentive design across miner tiers.

2.2 Principal Threshold

Boost uses a “principal threshold” as the benchmark stake amount:

  • p: principal ratio (admin configurable; default 10%)

  • B_usd: principal threshold in USD

B = P*V_usd

Intuition: higher-tier miners require a higher benchmark stake, proportional to their tier value.

2.3 Locked Pricing and USD Stake Value

Users stake BTB, but Boost calculations use the USD-equivalent value of the stake at order time:

  • stake_btb: amount of BTB staked

  • P_{usd/btb}: BTB reference price (USD/BTB), recommended as Index Price or TWAP

  • S_usd: USD-equivalent stake value (locked at order time)

S_USD = stake_btb*P_usd_per_btb

The reference price is snapshotted at order creation and stored in the user’s Boost position, ensuring deterministic multiplier computation.

2.4 Lock Duration

Boost requires staking to be locked for a fixed duration:

  • t_days: user-selected lock duration in days

  • t_{max}: maximum lock duration (365 days)


3. Multiplier Model

The Boost multiplier is computed from three components:

  1. principal completion ratio (r),

  2. time factor (T(t)), and

  3. an adjustment factor (D) used for either tier incentives or system-level cooling.

3.1 Principal Completion Ratio (r)

r measures how much of the principal threshold is covered by the stake value.

Capped model (bounded incentives, recommended for stability): r = min (S_usd/B_usd,1)

Interpretation:

  • r = 1: stake meets or exceeds the principal threshold

  • r = 0.5: stake covers half of the threshold

3.2 Time Factor (T(t))

Boost increases with time using a fixed weekly growth rate:

  • β: weekly growth coefficient (increment per 7 days)

A simple weekly accumulation form: T(t) = min(β*t/7 , T_max)

3.3 Adjustment Factor (D)

D is a configurable factor applied to shape incentives.

There are two common uses:

(A) Tier Incentive Factor Increase demand for premium miners by assigning higher D to higher tiers, making them more capital-efficient to boost.

(B) System Cooling Factor Reduce the multiplier during periods of high system utilization to protect emissions or maintain stability. In cooling mode, D is typically ≤ 1.

3.4 Final Boost Multiplier (M)

The final acceleration multiplier is:

M = 1 + r * T(t) * D

Where:

  • p defines the USD principal threshold relative to the miner tier value,

  • r measures how fully the threshold is met,

  • β controls the strength of time-based incentives,

  • D shapes tier demand and/or system stability.


4. Examples

Assume:

  • p = 10%

  • P_{usd/btb} = 0.5

  • β = 0.25 per week

  • D = 1 (no tier/cooling adjustment)

Example 1 — Single Miner, Principal Met, 28 Days

  • V = 500B = 0.1 × 500 = 50

  • Stake: 100 BTBS = 100 × 0.5 = 50

  • r = min(50/50, 1) = 1

  • t = 28 days → floor(28/7)=4T = 0.25 × 4 = 1.0

  • M = 1 + 1 × 1.0 × 1 = 2.0× Boosted

If uncapped principal ratio is enabled (r = S/B), larger stakes would scale r above 1, producing higher multipliers. This should be explicitly stated in the final protocol configuration.


Appendix — Definitions

  • V_usd: miner tier value (USD)

  • p: principal ratio

  • B_usd: principal threshold (USD)

  • stake_btb: BTB stake amount

  • P_usd_per_btb: locked reference price (USD/BTB)

  • S_usd: USD value of stake

  • t_days: lock duration (days), capped at 365

  • β: weekly growth coefficient

  • T(t): time factor

  • D: tier/cooling adjustment factor

  • M: final acceleration multiplier

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